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This paper analyses the link between forthcoming EU enlargement and selected aspects of EU 
institutional reforms, namely decision making rules in the European Central Bank and the status of 
the Eurogroup. It argues that some earlier arguments calling for urgent ECB reform are based on 
unrealistic assumptions. It concludes that the reform recently adopted by the EU Council as well as 
the present system, while not free from shortcomings, could provide a workable environment for 
monetary  policy  in  an  enlarged  EMU.  Additionally,  the  paper  claims  that  designing  efficient 
institutional solutions for the EU Council is also important from the perspective of new member 
states as it might impact o their chances for early adoption of the common currency.  




The  upcoming  2004  wave  of  European  Union  enlargement  and  prospects  of  accession 
countries  adopting  the  common  currency  in  the  following  years  have  motivated  the  EU  to 
undertake several important changes in its institutional design. The primary difficulty in adopting 
such reforms owes to the conflicting objectives of promoting greater efficiency in decision making 
at  the  EU  level  and  securing  the  rights  of  sovereign  Member  States  to  decide  themselves  on 
matters they consider important. The dilemmas faced on the occasion of current enlargement of 
the Union are arguably greater than was the case in the past due to very large number of new 
entrants, their different characteristics compared to the current EU member states and the much 
higher level of political and economic integration that was achieved in the Union during the decade 
of the 1990s.  
In particular, the enlargement of the EMU is often seen as a major challenge for the European 
Central  Bank  (ECB)  deciding  on  common  monetary  policy  in  the  euro-zone.  The  future  of 
economic policy co-ordination and in particular of fiscal policies might also be affected. This is the 
starting point of analysis in this paper. The main claim is that the arguments calling for ECB reform 
tend  to  overestimate  the  potential  negative  impact  of  enlargement.  Among  proposed  reform 
options  there  is  little  firm  evidence  clearly  supporting  one  over  the  other,  but  several  options 
appear  reasonable.  The  change  recently  adopted  by  the  EU  Council,  while  not  free  from 
shortcomings should nevertheless provide a reasonable environment for efficient monetary policy 
making in the enlarged EMU. Secondly, the paper argues that the outcome of the current hot 
discussion on the future decision making procedures in the EU Council (Nice Treaty solution vs. 
the one proposed by the Convention) and the legal status of the Eurogroup might prove important 
in shaping the attitude of current EMU member states towards enlargement. Under the pessimistic 
scenario,  incumbents  might  be  willing  to  delay  the  process  of  enlargement  to  ensure  efficient 
functioning of preferred co-operation mechanisms. The two main sections of the paper deal with 
the decision making mechanisms in the ECB and with the status of the Eurogroup. 
2. Deciding on EMU monetary policy after enlargement  
This section summarises the discussion on the need (or lack thereof) for a reform of decision 
making processes within the ECB after the Union enlarges from current 12 to above 20, 25 or more 
member states. As stipulated by Article 107 of the EC Treaty, the European System of the Central 
Banks (ESCB) is governed by the decision making bodies of the ECB, i.e. the Governing Council 
and the Executive Board. The Executive Board comprises six members (President, Vice-President 
and four regular members). As stated in Article 112 of the EC Treaty all Board members ‘shall be 
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appointed from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or 
banking  matters  by  common  accord  of  the  governments  of  the  Member  States  at  the  level  of 
Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the 
European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB’
2
. The Governing Council comprises 
members of the Executive Board and governors of the central banks of EMU member states. All 
members of the Governing Council have one vote and in most cases decisions are taken using the 
simple majority principle. In the event of a tie the President has the casting vote. In particular, 
interest rates decisions are taken using this principle. 
As in the case of other EU institutions, enlargement of the Union was generally viewed as 
demanding  a  reshaping  of  decision  making  rules  in  the  ECB.    However,  no  consensus  was 
reached during the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the Nice Treaty, which only stated 
that a change in ECB voting modalities was likely to take place and called for the ECB or the 
Commission to propose a reform ‘as soon as possible’. 
Two  major  arguments  for reform  are  put  forward  in  the  context  of  enlargement. First,  it  is 
argued  that  the  expected  EMU  enlargement  will  significantly  increase  the  share  of  small  fast 
growing  economies  in  the  union.  It  is  further  feared  that  the  preferences  of  many  Governing 
Council members might be affected by conditions in their home countries. If this was the case, the 
views of representatives of smaller catching-up economies might prevail in the Council and thus 
monetary policy might fail to reflect the needs of the biggest EMU economies (the ‘core’) and thus 
of the EMU as a whole. Second, it is claimed that the sheer size of the body deciding on monetary 
policy (the Governing Council) will become too large to secure efficient and meaningful discussion 
of economic development in the EMU and as a result the ability for able managing of the union’s 
monetary  policy  might  be  affected.  Indeed,  within  the  5-7  years  horizon  the  EMU  might  well 
comprise  25  or  so  member  states,  which  would  bring  the  number  of  people  in  the  Governing 
Council to above 30. 
2.1 Evaluation of the small countries’ bias argument 
After enlargement the number of small economies in the union will increase significantly. Also 
macroeconomic diversity within the EMU will widen, with most of the acceding small countries 
expected to exhibit higher average growth rates than the EMU core economies and also higher 
average  inflation  rates.  There  is  a  distinct  question  on  the  expected  sources  of  the  inflation 
differentials and how they should be tackled by the ECB. Such issues are discussed in more detail 
by e.g. Honohan and Lane (2003) and ECB (2003). Here we only observe that such differences 
might under some circumstance turn out important in the decision making process, providing that 
GC  members  put  more  weight  on  the  needs  of  the  countries  they  come  from  than  would  be 
                                                  
2
 The term ‘Member States’ applies here only to countries that adopted the common currency. Only representatives 
of these governments appoint the Executive Board members (cf. EC Treaty, Article 122 (4)). While at present unanimity 
is required for appointment decisions, the Commission has recently suggested that the Intergovernmental Conference 
should introduce qualified majority voting in this instance (cf. Commission, 2003).  
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justified by their respective country’s economic weight in the union. Such a phenomenon is referred 
to as a ‘regional bias hypothesis’. The Article 108 of the EC Treaty demands that GC members act 
independently in fulfilling their duties. Baldwin et al. (2001) comment: ‘A Panglossian observer 




Since the discussion and voting results within the GC are kept secret, there is no direct way to 
test the regional bias hypothesis. A narrative approach, looking at the interests of which countries 
were  best  secured  during  the  initial  period  of  the  EMU  functioning,  while  subject  to  strong 
methodological critique, does not in any case provide decisive results (cf. Baldwin et al. (2001)). 
The  US  Fed  represents  an  interesting  object  of  study  of  voting  behaviour  of  regional 
representatives. Most of the studies (see Meade and Sheets (2002) for a survey) found mixed and 
not very robust results. In a recent work Meade and Sheets (2002) illustrate a relationship between 
regional  unemployment  rates  and  attitudes  to  interest  rate  decisions  by  the  FOMC  members 
coming  from  respective  regions.  Regional  influences  are  found  among  both  regional  Fed 
Presidents and Board members and turn out to be actually stronger among this latter group. It is 
interesting to note that this finding raises doubts about the popular view that Frankfurt-based ECB 
Executive Board members will tend to care about EMU-wide developments while national central 
bank  governors  may  take  a  nationalistic  perspective.  Such  an  assumption  underpins  all  the 
scenarios  for  hypothetical  coalition  formation  in  the  GC  presented  by  Baldwin  et  al  (2001)  or 
Eichengreen and Ghironi (2001).   
There  is  little  doubt  that  EMU  enlargement  to  Central  and  East  European  countries  will 
significantly increase the economic heterogeneity of the union. Nevertheless the conclusion that 
this poses risks to Governing Council voting outcomes if central bank governors exhibit regional 
biases is not straightforward. Below we analyse the historical inflation patterns among members of 
the euro-zone of today and future members. The main emerging finding is that while enlargement 
of  the  euro-zone  is  indeed  likely  to  widen  the  inflation  dispersion  among  member  states,  the 
median  inflation  is  only  affected  to  a  limited  extent.  Moreover,  once  we  assume  six  Executive 
Board members to guide their decisions solely on EMU-wide inflation developments, the outcome 
of majority voting appears to mimic very well the outcome of decisions based on EMU-average 
inflation  only,  even  if  we  allow  central  bank  governors  to  exhibit  regional  biases.  While  past 
inflation experience might not provide good predictions for future developments after new countries 
join the monetary union, this exercise at least raises some doubts with regard to alarmist views on 
the impact of regional biases. 
                                                  
3
 Also, the Treaties do not explicitly demand that central bank governors of member states take into account union-
wide developments and not developments in their home economies. Governors are only banned from seeking advice or 
taking orders from EU or national bodies.   
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2.1.1 Modelling ECB Governing Council decision making in an EMU of 25. 
Let us concentrate on the worst-case scenario, giving rise to the most alarmist calls for reform. 
We assume that members of the Governing Council are motivated by local conditions in their home 
economies and ask what difference this makes to monetary policy in the EMU.  
Baldwin  et  al  (2001)  in  their  strong  criticism  on  the  one-man  one-vote  rule  at  the  ECB 
Governing  Council  base  some  of  their  arguments  on  a  model  assuming  that  interest  rates 
preferred by the country representatives (central bank governors) are uniformly distributed on the 
interval of possible interest rates (that is normalised to unity). More precisely, each central bank 
governor can derive the optimal (from the perspective of her home country) interest rate at any 
point in time but its future evolution is uncertain and equally likely to end up anywhere on the (0,1) 
interval
4
. It follows that, for any point in time, the expected ideal euro-area interest rate is 0.5. 
Authors then proceed to study the effects of shocks shifting the euro-area preferred rate and check 
the probability of the majority of voters being against adjusting the rates to the new optimum or 
only willing to accept a smallish adjustment. The reasoning is as follows. The Executive Board, 
taking the truly EMU-wide perspective is assumed to be controlling the agenda and making take-it-
or-leave-it interest rate offers that are then decided by majority voting. The EB is assumed to 
foresee the preferences of central bank governors and thus to make interest rates offers that are 
(1) able to gain majority support and (2) as close to the EMU-wide optimum as possible. What 
turns out is that under their specific assumptions, Baldwin et al. (2001) find that whereas in the 
EMU12 the probability of finding the GC majority supporting the interest rate adjustment to the new 
optimum is very high, it decreases significantly in the EMU27.  In the large union the most likely 
outcome is only a partial interest rate adjustment. Authors refer to this problem a ‘status quo bias’. 
Below we take a closer look at this hypothesis. 
We consider a one stage game in which the distribution of national inflation rates is given and 
the  question  is  what  interest  rates  will  be  decided  by  the  majority  voting  rule.  We  make  the 
following simplifying, though arguably not unrealistic assumptions: 
a)  the only parameter that ECB Executive Board members take into account to form their 
private preferences about monetary policy is the inflation rate in the euro-zone 
b)  the  only  parameter  that  central  bank  governors  take  into  account  to  form  their  private 
preferences about monetary policy is the inflation rate in their home economy 
c)  the only monetary policy tool that the ECB collectively decides is the interest rate 
d)  there is a monotonic relationship between observed inflation rates and preferred interest 
rates 
                                                  
4
 This implies that there are no structural differences between ‘core’ and ‘fast growing’ countries – both groups are 
assumed to be equally likely to prefer high or low interest rates. Also, such an assumption neglects the spillover effects 
between countries – the evolution of optimal interest rate levels in each country is independent from developments in 
other EMU economies.  
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e)  each member of the GC has its unique preferred interest rate level (bliss point) R*, and for 
any choice of two alternative interest rate levels either below or above R* he prefers the 
one closer to R*. 
Assumption (e) is the so called single-peakedness assumption (Black, 1958; for an exposition 
see e.g. Myerson, 1996). It ensures that a version of the median voter theorem holds. Specifically, 
under such conditions, if the number of voters is odd, the median voter’s bliss point is a Condorcet 
winner. This means that under normal conditions (i.e. excluding limitations to the voting agenda 
and manipulation of the agenda), the Governing Council would adopt the interest rate which is 
equal to the one preferred by the median voter.  
In order to get more insights from this very simple result one needs to have some idea on the 
distribution  of  interest  rates  preferences  among  members  of  the  Governing  Council.  In  the 
discussed model this largely boils down to a question of the distribution of inflation rates in the 
monetary union.  
Given that preferred interest rates are unobserved we concentrate on inflation rates that are 
arguably the main factor determining assessment of favoured interest rates. Below we present 
some  descriptive  statistics  describing  the  evolution  of  inflation  in  the  EMU11  and  hypothetical 
EMU25 (comprising 25 countries that will form the EU after May 2004) during the period 1998-
2002. 
Firstly we analyse the distribution of inflation rates between countries. Using monthly data we 
construct the intervals [minimum annual inflation rate, maximum annual inflation rate], normalise 
them to unity and calculate the number of countries in each decile. Averaging over time we can 
plot an approximation of the implied density function of inflation dispersion.  
Graph 1. Implied ‘density functions’ of inflation rates distribution in the EMU11 and EMU25 
Note:  Due  to  data  availability  January  1998-October  2002  period  was  used  for  calculating  EMU11  histograms  and 
January 2000-January 2002 period was used for EMU25. See main text for more explanations.  
Source: Own calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics CPI data.  
Graph 1 reveals that the distribution is heavily biased to the left. More specifically, inflation 
rates in above 50% of countries in the analysed period were in the three (EMU25 during 2000-
2001)  or  maximum  four  (EMU11  during  1998-2002)  lowest  deciles  of  the  distribution.  The 
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countries that initially adopted the euro in 1999. If anything, there appears to be even stronger 
concentration in the lowest deciles in a larger set of countries. These patterns have remained 
broadly  unchanged  over  time.  Calculating  implied  inflation  dispersion  densities  in  EMU11 
separately for each year between 1998-2002 one finds that over 50% of all countries had inflation 
rates in the lowest three deciles during two years (2000 and 2002), in the lowest four deciles in a 
further two years (1998 and 2001) and only in 1999 did they have inflation rates in the lowest five 
deciles. The general picture is thus one of a majority of countries recording low inflation figures and 
several outliers with significantly higher inflation figures. 
Another interesting insight is provided by comparing median inflation rates in EMU11, EMU25 
and  the  median  of  the  four  largest  economies  of  the  hypothetical  EMU25,  i.e.  Germany,  UK, 
France and Italy (Graph 2). The EMU25 median remained above EMU11 median throughout most 
of the period, although the difference rarely exceeded 0.5 percentage points (apart from 1998). 
Also, the EMU11 median remained slightly above Big4 median throughout most of the period. 
Graph 2. Median inflation rates in EMU11, EMU25 and in four largest EMU25 economies, January 
1998- October 2002 (% points) 
Notes:   Big4 group includes Germany, UK, France and Italy.  
  From mid-1999 HICP dynamics (not shown) was relatively close to median Big4 dynamics. 
Source:  Own calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics CPI data. 
An interesting question is whether the presence of six Executive Board members might make 
the difference to the outcome of voting in the GC. We maintain our assumption that central bank 
governors only look at domestic inflation rates and Executive Board members look at the HICP for 
the EMU as a whole. Graph 3 plots the results of an exercise in which median inflation value is 
calculated  in  the  set  of  17  ‘entities’,  consisting  of  11  EMU  countries  and  6  ‘euro-zones’  (with 
inflation  rates  set  at  HICP  value).  An  analogous  exercise  is  carried  for  EMU25,  where  in  the 
absence of officially calculated historical inflation series a GDP weighted average is taken as an 
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Graph 3. Median inflation rates in EMU11 and EMU(11+6) compared to HICP, January 1998- December 
2002 (% points) 
Notes:   Median for EMU(11+6) is defined as a median value of the set including six time the HICP value and each of 11 
national inflation rates.  
Source: Own calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics CPI data and ECB HICP data. 
Graph 4. Median inflation rates in EMU25 and EMU(25+6) compared to simulated EMU25 inflation 
rate,  January 1998- December 2002 (% points) 
 
Notes:   Median for EMU(25+6) is  defined as a  median value of the set  including six time the approximated EU25 
inflation value and each of 25 national inflation rates. 
EMU25 inflation rate is approximated by GDP weighted average inflation rate. Only OECD countries data were taken to 
the calculations. GDP data are current prices, current exchange rate 2000 data taken from OECD, Main Economic 
Indicators, October 2003 issue.  
Source: Own calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics CPI data and ECB HICP data. 
An interesting finding is that while in both cases median inflation is on average around 0.5 
percentage points above aggregate inflation, the difference almost disappears while the median is 
calculated in the larger set, including six time respective aggregate inflation rate. While in the case 
of EMU11 this is not really surprising, the fact that much the same holds true for a much larger 
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enlarged  but  unreformed  ECB  Governing  Council  could  still  produce  outcomes  close  to  EMU 
optimum. The pessimistic view of Baldwin et al (2001) is not really supported by this simulation 
based on real inflation
5
.  
The ECB Governing Council decides on interest rates rather than on inflation rates. While the 
link from one to the other is complicated, subject to uncertainty and varies between countries and 
over  time  it  is  likely  that  the  dispersion  of  national  preferred  interest  rates  is  smaller  than  the 
dispersion of observed national inflation rates. One argument is that a (perhaps substantial) part of 
differences in inflation rates might reflect natural adjustment processes (e.g. resulting from varying 
productivity growth rates) and to that extent should not be counteracted by economic policies
6
.  
Another  observation  is  that  due  to  strong  economic  linkages  between  the  countries  of  the 
current  and  the  future  enlarged  EMU,  national  preferred  interest  rates  should  incorporate  the 
preferences of other partners in the monetary union. If an important trade partner badly needs 
lower interest rates this should impact domestic objectives – even if only for purely self-interested 




In  conclusion,  we  have  illustrated  that  observed  inflation  differentials  have  not  led  to  a 
substantial  divergence  of  median  inflation  rates  in  EMU11  and  EMU25.  Six  Executive  Board 
members taking care of EMU-aggregate inflation should prevent the hypothetical ‘fast growing, 
high inflation’ group from gaining the majority in GC, also after EMU enlargement. Factors such as 
interdependence  of  preferred  interest  rates  and  lower  dispersion  of  interest  rates  compared  to 
inflation rates should further assure the optimal outcome of monetary policy in the enlarged EMU 
even if the one-man one-vote rule was to be maintained. The ‘regional bias’ pessimism in versions 
described by Baldwin et al (2001) and others does not appear to be justified. 
2.2 Evaluation of the Governing Council size argument  
The ECB Governing Council is already today a rather large. There are 18 members casting 
votes on interest rates decisions compared to 12 voting members of the US Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), and between 6 and 10 in monetary policy committees of Sweden, Canada, 
Australia,  UK  and  Poland.  However,  prior  to  German  unification  the  Bundesbank  Council  also 
included 18 members (7 Board members and 11 presidents of regional banks). After unification, 
the reform was implemented amounting to merging some regional banks and slightly reducing the 
size of the Board to 15 people.  
                                                  
5
 A word of caution is however needed. HICP and GDP weighted inflation average do not closely coincide for the 
EMU group, with the latter usually remaining slightly above HICP. This means that a correct HICP for EMU25 members 
would differ from the CPI values used in the exercise, which could have affected the outcome of the exercise. HICP 
differs conceptually from CPI measures. For a discussion see e.g. Cecchetti and Wynne (2003). 
6
 See ECB (2003) and references therein. 
7
 Grüner and Kiel (2002) discuss the issue in more detail and derive some theoretical implications.   
                 Studies & Analyses No. 256 – ECB Decision-making and the Status of the Eurogroup…  
14 
A further increase in the size of the ECB Governing Council (up to around 30 people) would 
clearly make it more difficult to carry open discussions on economic developments in the EMU 
involving all members of the body. The expected increase of the size of the Council was one of the 
reasons for the Bundesbank reform at the time of unification. One argument raised in this context 
is that there seems to be a culture of long discussions leading to ‘consensus’ decision making 
without using voting in the ECB Governing Council
8
. Clearly, even if decisions are taken without a 
formal vote it does not indicate that all members agree on a particular decision. Once positions of 
all members are known, the outcome of a potential vote is established anyway. While the ability of 
the Governing Council to carry on in-depth discussion would obviously be affected by enlargement, 
there would be no problems with the decision making procedure itself. Simple majority voting with 




The problem of the optimal size of the committees deciding on monetary policy has also been 
studied from the more formal perspective applying the tools of game theory. This literature, while 
providing some interesting results under specific sets of assumptions does not come out with any 
clear  cut  recommendations.  The  optimal  size  of  the  committee  can  be  affected,  among  other 
things, by factors such as costs of accessing private information and heterogeneity of objective 
functions among committee members. An up-to-date survey of relevant literature is provided by 
Gerling et al (2003). 
In  summary,  the  issue  of  the  size  of  the  Governing  Council  indeed  constitutes  a  potential 
problem for this body’s ability to take swift policy decisions. There is no experience of other central 
banks with such large decision  making bodies. On the other hand, the ECB itself is  a unique 
institution in global economic history. Proposals to limit the size of the GC would be welcome, 
providing they fulfil other criteria discussed below. Whether the GC of 30 or so people could well 
organise its work remains uncertain but cannot be ruled out.  
There  is  even  less  direct  evidence  concerning  the  validity  of  the  regional  bias  hypothesis. 
Again, any reform proposal truly limiting its potential impact (i.e. not just appearing to do so by 
merely increasing the size of the Executive Board) would be welcome, but failing to address this 
issue need not turn out to be damaging. In the end, the general public and market perception 
functioning of the GC will likely be a decisive factor. The lesson is, therefore, that political chaos 
surrounding any reform projects should be avoided.
10
 
                                                  
8
 No information is available on the Governing Council discussions and voting. This assertion rests on some public 
comments made by GC members. For instance, during the ECB press conference on 3 February 2000 Wim Duisenberg 
said: ‘there was no formal vote. Again, as I had hoped and as it was, it was a consensus decision’. 
9
 This stands in contrast to the situation in the Council of Ministers, where the threshold for majority voting is above 
50%. We return to this issue while discussing the functioning of ECOFIN. 
10
 If the Governing Council is perceived as inefficient in managing the EMU monetary policy and subject to regional 
biases, the prospects for the union would turn negative irrespective of the actual abilities of the GC. By the same token, 
even if internal discussions are difficult and some members overemphasise local conditions, but the credibility of the ECB 
is maintained, it would not necessarily have significant negative impact on the functioning of the union. Recall that no 
details of internal discussions and voting are revealed to the public.  
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2.3 Possible solutions  
Several solutions were proposed that could solve one or both of the above problems. These 
mainly  reflect  the  experience  of  existing  arrangements  in  other  institutions  facing  similar 
challenges. The major ideas implemented (in various combinations) are rotation, representation 
(forming constituencies) and executive decisions (delegation to technocrats). 
Firstly  one  can  think  of  systems  where  the  composition  of  the  Governing  Council  remains 
unchanged, but the rights to vote on policy decisions are given to a subgroup of GC members at 
any one time. Voting rights would rotate among GC members according to an agreed schedule. 
This demands that a number of voting members is decided and a period for which they retain 
voting rights. The advantage of such an approach is that it can limit the problem related to the 
number of people at the discussion table. However, this is only possible when non-voting members 
are  excluded  from  discussions,  which  in  turn  would  have  some  negative  consequences.  For 
instance members just starting their voting period would not know what was the state of discussion 
in previous months or years. 
Another solution would be to form groups of central bankers with each of the group delegating 
its representative for voting (and possibly also discussion). Such a system is used in the IMF Board 
of Directors
11
. Under such arrangement the number of people at the table could be reduced (again, 
providing that non-voting GC members do not participate in discussions). On the other hand, it 
would seem natural to treat representatives of groups as standing for interest of their groups rather 
than being independent experts on EMU monetary policy. It could therefore actually worsen the 
regional bias problem. 
One could combine any of the above systems with a weighting of countries’ votes by, say, 
shares in the ECB capital
12
. This would make ECB decision-making rules similar to the ones in 
operation in some other EU institutions, in particular the qualified majority voting in the EU Council. 
Such a solution would have the advantage of making irrelevant the regional bias hypothesis, since 
even under purely nationalistic behaviour of GC members voting would still on average be close to 
the EMU-wide optimum
13
. On the negative side, it might strengthen the perception of monetary 
policy  decisions  as  the  outcome  of  a  game  between  national  representatives  rather  than  one 
motivated by the aggregate needs of the euro-zone. It is interesting to note that a weighted voting 
scheme for the ECB Governing Council was one of the possibilities discussed during the 1990 IGC 
on monetary union. The proposal from the European Commission advocating such a solution was 
at that time opposed by the Bundesbank and the German Ministry of Finance, who feared that it 
                                                  
11
 Note, that there are above 180 countries at the IMF so the scale of the ‘number problem’ is of different nature. 
Also, for most countries, decisions taken by this body are of much lower relevance in normal economic times than is the 
case of Governing Council decisions in the European Monetary Union. 
12
 ECB capital shares are in turn determined as a sum of half of the share in EMU GDP and half of a share in EMU 
population (cf. Article 29, Protocol on the Statue of the ESCB and of the ECB). 
13
 See Aksoy et al. (2002) for discussion on how does weighed average of countries’ optimal policies correspond to 
EMU optimal policy.  
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would  ‘encourag[e]  a  damaging  spirit  of  compromise  amongst  national  interests’.  (Heisenberg 
2003). 
Yet  another  possibility  is  to  delegate  running  monetary  policy  to  a  small  monetary  policy 
council consisting of experts, without looking at their nationalities. Such a move would be more 
radical  as  it  would  constitute  a  departure  from  the  original  ESCB  architecture  put  into  the  EC 
Treaty. It is however an actually applied solution in a number of countries, such as the UK which is 
commonly perceived as an example of extremely successful monetary policy making (see Begg et 
al., 2003). This solution would solve both the ‘numbers’ and regional bias problems, provided that 
members  of  this  body  could  indeed  be  regarded  as  fully  independent  and  not  influenced  by 
developments in their home countries. The major disadvantage is that it could possibly undermine 
the accountability of the ECB. The point is that governors of central banks of member states can 
be perceived as playing the role of national ‘listening post’ ensuring the ECB is accountable to 
someone with strong credibility in the home country (Baldwin et al, 2001). 
Also,  there  are  some  potential  gains  from  having  national  representatives  in  the  decision 
making body which would be lost by delegating the policy to a small council of experts. Central 
bank governors may have better information concerning their economies and better understanding 
of the policy transmission channels. Indeed, in the US regional board governors sitting in the Open 
Marker Committee of the Fed are regarded as experts on local developments. In the words of Alan 
Greenspan: ‘As keen observers of local economies, the directors here and elsewhere contribute 
vitally to the formulation of monetary policy by offering important insights absent, by definition, from 
even  the  most  careful  analysis  of  aggregate  data.  Often  they  know  what  is  happening  in  the 




Developments at the level of countries are clearly not irrelevant, despite the ECB focus on 
euro-zone aggregate performance. De Grauwe and Sénégas (2003) find that the uncertainty about 
the  transmission  process  increases  the  need  to  take  into  account  information  about  national 
economies  (and  not  only  aggregate  data)  in  the  formulation  of  optimal  monetary  policies  in  a 
monetary  union.  Earlier  studies  cited  there  found  that  asymmetries  in  the  transmission 
mechanisms (even in the absence of uncertainty) also call for considering national data.  
Finally, one might still be sceptical about the possibility of first finding and then selecting in a 
political process of monetary policy experts able to fully forget about their national attachments. 
The Meade and Sheets (2002) finding of regional biases among FOMC Board members could be 
interpreted as giving support to such scepticism. One could note that in a small monetary policy 
committee a large proportion (or even exclusivity) of members are very likely to come from the 
large countries. This is for two reasons: (1) what one might call the “Trichet effect“, i.e. simple 
bullying by the governments of the large countries, to make sure that their nationals get selected; 
(2) a “demographic effect“, resulting from the fact that, with talent being distributed democratically, 
                                                  
14
 Alan Greenspan, December 2000. Cited in Meade and Sheets (2002).   
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council members are likely to come from countries roughly in proportion to their population (or GDP 
if that is taken to reflect the “human capital“ available to train top economists). Thus, this can lead 
to a monetary policy committee becoming excessively dominated by large countries even in the 
presence of appointment purely by merit. 
Table 1. Pros and Cons of various ECB reform options 









‘number problem’  Yes 
a  Yes 
a  No  Yes 
Solving the ‘small 
countries’ bias’  Yes
 c  Yes
 c  Yes  Yes 
Building sense of 
common European 
identity 
No  No 
b  No  Yes 
d 




c  Yes 
c  Yes  No 
Notes: 
a – providing non-voting members do not participate in discussions. 
b – unless one regards building identity within smaller groups as a step to European identity building. This point 
could be debatable. Heisenberg (2003) claims that grouping of member states might help in building the common 
European identity. 
c – debatable, might depend on details. 
d – unless the MPC is excessively dominated by large countries. 
Source: own elaboration. Compare Heisenberg (2003). 
2.4 An evaluation of the ECB reform proposal 
In line with the Nice Summit, in December 2002, two years after the signing of the Treaty, but 
soon  after  its  acceptance  by  a  second  Irish  referendum,  the  ECB  revealed  its  proposal  for 
reforming the voting modalities of the Governing Council. On 3
rd February, 2003, just after the Nice 
Treaty entered into force, the ECB published its official recommendation for the European Council 
‘on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of 
the European Central Bank’
15
. The recommendation proposes to introduce a rotation system in a 
manner taking into account the economic weight of member states.  
The ECB recommendation states clearly that it is motivated by ‘a need to maintain Governing 
Council’s capacity for efficient and timely decision-making in an enlarged euro area, irrespective of 
the number of Member States that adopt the euro’. It also explicitly argues that ’the design of the 
rotation system should be guided by five fundamental principles, i.e. ‘one member one vote’; ‘ad 
personam participation’; ‘representativeness’; ‘automaticity/robustness’ and  transparency’.  
                                                  
15
 European Central Bank, Recommendation, under Article 10.6 of the Statue of the ESCB and of the ECB, for a 
Council Decision on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statue of the ESCB and of the ECB, (ECB/2003/1), 3 February 
2003.  
                 Studies & Analyses No. 256 – ECB Decision-making and the Status of the Eurogroup…  
18 
The proposed solution is that while all central bank governors should continue to take part in 
Governing Council discussions, some of them will temporarily not have a vote on interest rate 
decisions.  Six  members  of  the  Executive  Board  will  retain  their  rights  to  vote  at  all  times,  but 
governors of national central banks will be allocated not more than 15 voting rights. The rights will 
rotate within two groups (for an EMU of 16-21 countries) or three groups (if the EMU comprises of 
more than 21 member states). All countries will be ranked according to their share in EMU GDP 
(weight 5/6) and the share in the total aggregated balance sheet of monetary financial institutions 
(‘TABS-MFIs’, weight 1/6). The five biggest economies according to this ranking will form the first 
group with four voting rights. In the scenario with two groups all other countries will be allocated 11 
voting rights. When 22 or more countries participate in the EMU, the allocation of voting rights to 
the ‘Big 5’ group will be unchanged (i.e. 4 rights). The second group will comprise half of all EMU 
member states (coming after the ‘Big 5’ in the ranking) that will share 8 voting rights. Remaining 
countries will have 3 voting rights at their disposal.  
Such  a  procedure  clearly  introduces  some  ‘breaking  points’  resulting  from  changes  in  the 
ranking  due  to  new  economic  data  and/or  inclusion  of  new  countries  to  the  EMU.  In  many 
constellations  the  automatic  application  of  the  rule  would  produce  outcomes  unwarrantedly 
beneficial or detrimental to some countries or groups of countries. One such scenario, where at 
some stage there were 16-18 member states forming two groups, with the five biggest economies 
sharing four votes and the remaining 11-13 countries sharing 11 votes is explicitly excluded by the 
additional requirement that ‘The frequency of voting rights of the governors allocated to the first 
group shall not be lower than the frequency of voting rights of those of the second group.’ Also, a 
kind of a transitory escape clause arrangement is included stipulating that the introduction of the 
rotation  system  might  in  fact  be  postponed  until  the  EMU  is  enlarged  to  comprise  at  least  19 
countries.  It  is  likely  that  the  rotation  system  will  not  be  implemented  until  there  are  19  EMU 
member states, i.e. until seven new countries (out of 3 current EU members and 10 candidates) 
join. This seems rather unlikely to happen before 2007-2008. More generally, some degree of ad 
hoc decision making regarding the voting modalities cannot be avoided. These issues, according 
to the ECB proposal, will be decided by all Governing Council members – irrespective of whether 
or not they hold a voting right at the time of the decision – by a two-thirds majority. 
It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  the  proposed  system  is  a  compromise  trying  to  address  the 
contradictory principles of ‘one member one vote’ versus ‘representativeness’ with an attempt to 
control for ‘automaticity and robustness’. It seems fair to say that, for most sizes of the EMU, it 
reduces the ‘small countries bias’ present in the current system (where the governor of the central 
bank of Luxembourg has the same impact on ECB interest rates as the Bundesbank governor). 
This perhaps does not go far enough to satisfy everyone in the biggest EMU economies but has 
already sparked voices of protests in some small countries.  
The  proposal  does  not  address  the  issue  of  the  large  number  of  persons  participating  in 
monetary policy discussions and decisions. It is hard to believe that the difference between: (a) 
having  around  30  members  participating  in  the  discussion  followed  by  a  vote  of  21  and,  (b)  
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allowing all members to vote, is substantial for the efficiency of the process. The hope is that the 
simple majority decision rule should assure reasonable results in any case
16
. 
Graph 5. The size of the EMU and the distribution of voting rights  
Note: The distribution of voting rights is presented only for EMU of more than 18 member states. See text for discussion. 
The complexity of the proposed solution is in itself a reason for criticism. Indeed, the proposed 
algorithm cannot be described as simple and it will demand some degree of ad hoc modifications. 
This might be bad for the transparency of the ECB and public perception of its functioning. On the 
other hand, it should not come as a real problem for financial markets that deal with much more 
complicated issues. 
One  more  important  criticism  regards  the  criteria  for  the  ranking  of  member  states  and 
consequently the division into groups. The inclusion of the indicator of the size of the financial 
sector indicator (TABS-MFIs) with a weight of 1/6 on top of GDP (weight 5/6), without taking into 
account  population  shares  must  be  viewed  as  arbitrary.  There  seem  to  be  no  convincing 
arguments  for  choosing  such  a  set  of  indicators  and  ignoring  the  benchmark  provided  by  the 
shares in the ECB capital that is applied in many decision making procedures in the Bank
17
. It is 
hard  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  this  set  of  indicators  was  tailored  to  favour  the  interest  of 
Luxembourg (very small economy with large financial sector) and in general of the incumbent EMU 
member  states  at  the  expense  of  prospective  new  entrants  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
(whose share in EMU aggregate GDP and TABS-MFIs is much below the share in population). As 
illustrated by Gros (2003), the adoption of these criteria results in the third rotating group being 
composed  of  only  CEE  countries  and  leaves  Poland  out  of  the  ‘Big  5”  group  even  if  the  UK 
chooses not to enter the EMU before Poland does (see Table 2). Also, estimations based on 2002 
data  would  put  Luxembourg  (population  of  0.45  million)  in  group  2,  while  Romania  with  a 
                                                  
16
 It is instructive to compare this with the QMV decision making rule for the European Council agreed in Nice that 
allocates the voting rights more fairly to member countries but sets the qualified majority threshold at a very high level.  
17
 For instance all GC decisions concerning issues such as capital of the ECB, policies with regard to foreign reserve 
assets, allocation of profits and losses of the ECB, etc. are taken by the qualified majority voting with weights equal to the 
shares in the ECB capital and the threshold set at two thirds (cf. ECBS Statute, Article 10.3). The shares in the ECB 
capital are equal to the sum of half of the share of a respective member country in the union’s population and half of the 
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population of 21.7 million would be in group 3. On the other hand the same table also reveals that 
adopting the shares in ECB capital as a basis for the ranking would not change the allocation to 
groups radically. Still, this system is likely to be perceived as frustrating in CEE, particularly as  
these countries had no say on the reform, and will have no impact on whether it is ratified by 
current  member  states  or  not.  This  could  pose  risks  for  the  democratic  legitimacy  and 
accountability of the ECB.  
Table 2. Estimated allocation of countries to groups (according to the methodology proposed by the 
ECB and the ranking based on shares in ECB capital) 
  Euro-22 (current euro-zone 
plus 10 countries expected 
to join the EU in 2004) – 
without the UK, Sweden and 
Denmark (ranked using the 
ECB methodology) 
Euro-25 (current EU plus 10 
countries expected to join 
the EU in 2004) (ranked 
using the ECB 
methodology) 
Euro-25 – ranked by share 
in ECB capital  
Group 1  
















Group 2  
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Note:  Classification  is  based  on  estimated  2002  data  (2001  data  in  the  last  column).  EU  candidate  economies  on 
average are growing faster than most of current EU countries so as times passes one should expect gradual 
changes in the ranking. 
Source: Gros (2003) and Lommatzsch and Tober (2002).  
The ECB proposal was accepted by the EU Council on 21 March 2003, which indicates that 
once it is ratified by all member states it will enter into force
18
. However, the discussion is by no 
means over, since some other reform options might be brought to the agenda again either during 
                                                  
18
 Decision of the Council was published in the Official Journal of the European Union, L83, Vol. 46, 1 April 2003, pp. 
66-68.  
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the Intergovernmental Conference that started in October 2003 or at some later date
19
. As it stands 
now, the Central and Eastern European accession countries will have nothing to say about the 
current round of the ECB reform, unless the Council decision is not ratified or the reform discussion 
will re-open before the currently agreed system is implemented (approximately 2007-2009). 
3. The Eurogroup in an enlarged EU 
The Eurogroup is an informal grouping of the finance ministers of the countries that adopted 
the common currency. It is not based in any Treaty provisions and does not have any decision 
making powers. It serves as a forum for consultation and discussion. Lack of any formal powers 
does not mean that it is not an important body. On the contrary, it could be argued that it is the 
Eurogroup’s informal setting that makes is particularly influential and relevant in the functioning of 
the EU (Puetter, 2003).  
A  brief  historical  excursion  might  be  helpful  in  understanding  the  current  discussion  on 
economic  policy  co-ordination  in  EMU,  the  positions  of  various  actors  and  how  EU  and  EMU 
enlargement matter in this context. The Maastricht Treaty assumed that EMU economic policy 
(apart  from  monetary  policy  delegated  to  the  independent  ECB)  would  be  carried  at  the 
intergovernmental level with the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of Ministers (ECOFIN) 
being the central institution. ECOFIN groups ministers from all EU countries, including those that 
do  not  adopt  the  euro.  Until  1996-1997  the  discussion  on  EU  economic  co-ordination  largely 
concentrated on building of the set of rules that would guarantee the stability of the monetary 
union. In 1995, Germany put forward the Stability and Growth Pact to prevent inflation fuelled by 
fiscal expansion and to assure mechanisms of efficient implementation of Article 104 of the Treaty 
(banning  excessive  deficits).  During  the  1997  Luxembourg  Summit  it  was  agreed  that  the 
introduction  of  a  common  currency  makes  closer  co-operation  between  EMU  member  states 
necessary and thus the Eurogroup was established. Its first meeting was held in mid-1998 and 
since then ministers gather regularly, in parallel to ECOFIN meetings.  
The Eurogroup has some specific features that make it distinct from other EU institutions. First, 
it is a very small body with only two persons (the minister and one advisor) representing each 
country. Second, the informal character of the group, the confidentiality of the discussions and lack 
of decision making powers arguably make it much easier to debate difficult and sensitive issues in 
a more open manner. The atmosphere of co-operation and compromise might be easier to achieve 
than at the ECOFIN forum where rivalry might be more natural
20
. This feature of the Eurogroup is 
particularly valuable since these same ministers meet later in the ECOFIN, where many decisions 
are taken by qualified majority voting. This implies that in the current setting a compromise worked 
                                                  
19
 While the Council took the decision unanimously, there was opposition coming particularly from Finland and the 
Netherlands. The opinion of the European Parliament was largely critical, while the European Commission supported the 
broad idea but voiced its preference towards including the population parameter in constructing the ranking. 
20
 See the discussion and references in Puetter (2001).   
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out  by  the  Eurogroup  can  be  easily  imposed  on  the  ECOFIN  or  in  any  case  earlier  round  of 
Eurogroup discussions might be helpful in reaching some deal in the ECOFIN.  
After  the  2004  wave  of  EU  enlargement  (and  before  enlargement  of  the  EMU)  this  might 
become slightly more complicated. Twelve current euro-zone countries will have 60% of votes in 
the ECOFIN of 25 states, i.e. below the qualified majority threshold
21
. Still, nothing can be decided 
at the ECOFIN without the support of the euro-group countries (assuming they act together) and 
they will need the support of only a few other countries to get their way. On the other hand, ten EU 
accession countries will also become quite powerful in the ECOFIN (and other Council of Ministers 
bodies) since their cumulative share in votes will be above 26% of the total (in the EU-25), around 
the  blocking  minority  threshold.  In  other  words  the  position  of  new  EU  member  states  might 
actually be stronger in the Council of Ministers than in the ECB Governing Council (if one sees the 
latter as a place where national interests are represented).
22
  
Such  a  situation  is  potentially  dangerous  from  the  perspective  of  the  effectiveness  of  the 
functioning of the most important EU institutions. There is a risk that the Council is paralysed by 
being unable to take decisions on certain issues. If this black scenario materialises, there will be 
strong incentives for the creation of smaller more efficient bodies facilitating integration within the 
EU  (subgroups  of  countries).  In  particular  the  Eurogroup  might  become  one  such  institution, 
challenging  the  role  of  the  ECOFIN  by  gaining  some  formal  powers.  If  the  Eurogroup  indeed 
becomes  a  remedy  for  inefficient  economic  policy  dialogue  and  co-ordination  within  the  EU, 
because of ECOFIN’s size and difficult Nice Treaty decision making rules, the natural reaction of 
current  euro-zone  member  states  might  be  to  try  to  slow  the  EMU  enlargement  process 
(Rostowski, 2003).  
Current euro-zone countries indeed appear interested in giving Eurogroup ministers the key 
say on EMU matters, without involvement of the non-euro countries
23
. The draft EU Constitutions 
proposes  that  only  euro-zone  member  states  will  vote  (applying  the  qualified  majority  rule)  on 
economic  policy  guidelines  and  surveillance  of  them  and  excessive  deficits.  Also,  euro-zone 
countries are to be allowed to co-ordinate actions and take common positions within international 
institutions, where they might also be represented in a unified manner
24
. The Protocol on the Euro 
Group that was annexed to the draft Constitution confirms the current practice of informal meeting 
of the euro-zone ministers but introduces one new element, by proposing the establishment of a 
euro area president elected for two years by a majority of EMU member states. This proposal 
would clearly further strengthen the international position of the euro-zone, possibly at the cost of 
                                                  
21
 According to the allocation of votes agreed in the Nice Treaty. The draft EU Constitution proposes a reform of that 
system which, however, even if accepted, is not envisaged to enter into force before 2009. After this date current non-
EMU members will have a majority of states in the ECOFIN and will therefore still be able to block decisions (assuming 
they act together). 
22
 The explanation of this phenomenon rests in the difference in the voting rules – simple majority rule in the ECB 
Governing Council does not allow a small group of representatives to block the proposal of the majority, whereas this is 
relatively easy in the European Council due to the very high majority threshold.  
23 See ‘Eurozone bids to limit voting of non-euro countries’, Financial Times, 13 May 2003. 
24 European Convention (2003), Article III-85.  
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weakening the position of EU non euro countries. The European Commission is also a strong 
advocate of giving formal powers to the Eurogroup and enabling closer policy co-ordination within 
the euro-zone. European Commission (2003) clearly states that ‘the Ministers of Finance of the 
euro zone must be able to meet and take decisions as the Ecofin Council for the euro zone’. 
The question of the legal position of the Eurogroup in the enlarged EU is strongly linked to two 
other issues. Firstly, the qualified majority voting rules and more generally the decision-making 
rules of the Council are important. The draft Constitution proposes a significant simplification of the 
Nice Treaty regulations that also strengthens the relative position of the largest and – to a lesser 
extent – the smallest EU member states relative to the Nice rules
25
. Also, there is tendency for 
reducing the number of areas where unanimity is required
26
. The outcome of current debates on 
these proposals will ultimately shape the allocation of power between various EU actors. Secondly, 
the  prospects  of  closer  economic  policy  co-ordination  in  the  EMU,  particularly  with  respect  to 
budgetary policies play a role. For instance, there are widely divergent views on the functioning of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, the credibility of which is in any case being tested with France and 
Germany likely to breach the 3% deficit ceiling for the third year in a row in 2004
27
. At the same 
time there is strong pressure from the Commission to strengthen its role in economic policy co-
ordination (e.g. Commission, 2003).  
4. Conclusions 
There is very little one can say with certainty on the optimal design of the monetary policy 
decision making processes in a large and heterogeneous monetary union such as the EMU. The 
presented evidence indicates that several different solutions might work well, despite their potential 
shortcomings.  The  currently  applied  one-man  one-vote,  simple  majority  procedure  in  the  ECB 
Governing Council appears to be performing well, if judged from numerous reports monitoring the 
ECB  performance  in  its  early  years.  This  paper  argues  that  EMU  enlargement  would  not 
necessarily undermine the effectiveness of the current rules. The reform proposed by the ECB 
itself, currently at the stage of ratification by member states, also provides a reasonable framework 
for monetary policy making in the larger monetary union. Its major drawbacks are rooted in the 
sphere of intra-EU politics, rather than in economic effectiveness.  
The design of the current ECB architecture was influenced by the experience of the functioning 
of the Bundesbank. Since the UK stayed outside the euro-zone, there was much less impact from 
the practice of direct inflation targeting frameworks steered by a small monetary policy council 
consisting of monetary policy experts
28
. Such ‘policy culture’ influences arguably have a strong 
                                                  
25 For an exposition see e.g. Baldwin and Widgren (2003). 
26 Commission (2003) proposes to further widen the area in which qualified majority voting rather than unanimity is 
applied. 
27 Recent papers presenting different views on the Stability and Growth Pact include Eichengreen (2003), Fatas and 
Mihov (2003), Wyplosz (2002) and Gali and Perotti (2003).  
28 Begg et al. (2003) argue that countries staying out of particular EU arrangements have limited impact at the stage 
of building respective institutions.   
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impact  on  institutional  design.  Consequently,  one  should  not  expect  a  major  revolution  in  the 
decision making rules of the ECB in the near future.  
The prospects of EMU enlargement clearly have some impact on the discussion of the future 
of the Eurogroup and ECOFIN, and on economic policy co-ordination at the level of the euro-zone 
and of the EU as a whole. However, these discussions are largely driven by other considerations 
and  the  positions  of  major  actors  are  determined  by  their  specific  experience  and  goals.  The 
analysis of the optimal level of economic policy co-ordination lies outside the scope of this paper. 
From the perspective of accession countries, assuming they are willing and able to quickly adopt 
the  euro,  the  risk  is  that  the  functioning  of  ECOFIN  becomes  inefficient  and  the  Eurogroup 
emerges as a way to overcome this problem. In such a scenario, there might be opposition from 
incumbents to let new members into EMU, as this could undermine the efficiency of the functioning 
of the Eurogroup and thus the monetary union as a whole. Designing efficient institutional solutions 
for economic policies in the enlarged EU is thus in the best interest of all EU members, though this 
task  is  much  complicated  by  the  sheer  size  of  the  union  and  diverging  views  on  the  optimal 
balance of checks and powers between actors involved.  
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